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STUDENT ARTICLE
A Critical Look at the Non-Economic
Damage Cap of the HEALTH Act of 2005

and its Impact on Consumers
Shirley Chiu*

I.

INTRODUCTION

According to the Bush administration, the United States is
experiencing a medical malpractice insurance crisis.1 Skyrocketing
malpractice premiums are blamed for driving physicians who
specialize in high risk fields, such as orthopedics, neurosurgery,
obstetrics-gynecology, and general surgery, from practicing in these
areas, 2 and forcing physicians in geographical regions with high3
malpractice insurance premiums to move to areas with lower rates.
Consequently, rural regions in particular are left with fewer doctors,
thereby limiting patients' accessibility to health care.4 Many critics
blame large jury verdicts for the high medical malpractice
premiums. Additionally, trial lawyers are accused of filing frivolous

* J.D. candidate, May 2008, Loyola University Chicago School of Law; B.A.
Economics, 2002, University of Chicago. The author would like to thank her
family, friends, and members of the Loyola Consumer Law Review for their
helpful comments, patience, and support.

1 Kathryn Zeiler, Turningfrom Damage Caps to Information Disclosure:An
Alternative to Tort Reform, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICs 385, 385 (2005)
(discussing where the Bush Administration stands on damage caps).
2 Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice
Damage Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 410 (2005).
3 Warren Vieth, PresidentDemands Tort Reform, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2005.
4 Id.
5Id.
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6
claims and have been blamed for the premium increases.
In response, Congress recently proposed House Bill 534, the
"Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare"
("HEALTH") Act of 2005. 7 The bill aims to lower health care
liability insurance by imposing caps on both punitive and noneconomic damages, limiting attorney contingency fees, and reducing
the statute of limitation on medical malpractice cases. 8 The most
controversial, yet fundamental aspect of the bill, limits non-economic
damages to $250,000. 9 In states that recognize punitive damages,
such damages are reserved for only the most egregious cases. 10 The
hope of policymakers is that curtailing large jury verdicts will lead to
fewer frivolous lawsuits, which in turn should reduce doctors'
exposure to medical malpractice liability and lower malpractice
insurance premiums.' Medical malpractice litigation claims are
estimated to cost the American economy $233 billion per year.12
Even so, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that
medical malpractice lawsuits only make up less than two percent of
the nation's health care spending. 13 Additionally, some legal scholars
and attorneys argue that imposing caps on damages, especially those
that are non-economic, may actually reduce the number of
meritorious medical malpractice cases filed because costs of litigation
may exceed the expected award of damages. 14
The real economic impact of medical litigation can also be
felt locally. The American Medical Association reports that as many
as twenty states are experiencing full-blown medical liability crises.

6 Mark Silva, Bush Callsfor Limits Class Action Lawsuits, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 6,
2005, at 9.
7 Help Efficient, Accessible, Low Cost, Timely Health Care (HEALTH)
Act
of 2005, H.R. 534, 109th Cong. (2005).
8 Id.

Id. at § 4(b).
'0 Silva, supra note 6.
9

"1

Id.

12

Id. at 9.

13

Geoff Boehm, Debunking Medical Malpractice Myths: Unraveling the

FalsePremises Behind "Tort Reform, " 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 357,

362 (2005).
14 Zeiler, supra note
1, at 386.
15 Sharkey, supra note 2,
at 406.
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In Illinois, Cook County alone, in 2004, entered jury awards
exceeding $5 million against hospitals and doctors in medical
malpractice cases, which amounted to a total of $123 million, eighty
percent of which were non-economic damages.' 6 Furthermore, in the
first half of 2005, fourteen of the twenty-eight largest settlements in
Cook County were in medical malpractice cases.1 These settlements
alone totaled $136.93 million. 18 There is concern by policymakers
that such verdicts may adversely affect consumers because medical
malpractice costs, including payouts and attorney's fees, decrease
hospital operating margins and leave fewer dollars to improve
facilities and patient care. 19 Therefore, it is not surprising that Illinois,
along with Alaska, and New Hampshire recently passed legislation
to
20
address the increasing costs of medical malpractice insurance.
This article will demonstrate that non-economic damage caps,
like those contained in the HEALTH Act of 2005, are unlikely to
lower medical malpractice premiums faced by physicians and will
not resolve the problems currently plaguing doctors due to high
insurance premiums. Instead, caps will help insurance companies at
the expense of the most severely injured medical malpractice victims
and offer little to no benefit to doctors or health care consumers.
Section II of this Article provides a legal background on federal
legislation curbing medical malpractice claims, and state court views
toward the constitutionality of non-economic damage caps. Section
III discusses the purposes and non-economic damage cap component
of the proposed HEALTH Act. Section IV examines the effects and
constitutionality of the proposed non-economic and punitive damages
caps set forth in the HEALTH Act, on health care consumers and
physicians, in addition to providing alternative solutions. Finally,
Section V discusses the likely impact of non-economic damage caps
on health care consumers if the HEALTH Act is passed.

16

Max Douglas Brown, Editorial, Here's to Your Good Health; Until We Get

Tort Reform, it's Patients Who Will Feel the Pain, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 17, 2005, at 27.
17 Libby Sander, 2005 Settlement Survey: Looking Ahead to Litigation Under
the Med-Mal Caps, CHI.

LAWYER,

Oct. 2005, at 8.

18 Id.

19 Id.
20

TRIAL,

Ass'n Trial Law. Am., Three States Pass Medical MalpracticeLegislation,

Aug. 2005, at 10. (stating that Alaska capped non-economic damages at

$250,000, Illinois capped non-economic damages at $500,000, and New Hampshire

created a three-person screening panel to review medical injury action before trial
to determine whether a health care provider was negligent).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Federal Responses to Medical Malpractice Litigation
Medical malpractice insurance crises are not new to the
United States. There has been at least one national malpractice
insurance crisis resulting from high medical malpractice premiums in
every decade since the 1970s. 2 1 In response, Congress has tried to
pass a number of bills to resolve the problems caused by medical
malpractice litigation. 22 Much of the proposed legislation, like the
HEALTH Act of 2005, sought to cap non-economic damages at
$250,000.23 Since 1999, Congress has proposed at least five bills,
each of which included a cap on non-economic damages in medical
malpractice cases. In 1999, Congress introduced the Medical
Malpractice Rx Act that proposed a $250,000 limit on non-economic
damages. 24 The Act was referred to the subcommittee on Health and
Environment and was not introduced back to the House. 25 In 2000,
Congress introduced a revised version of the Health Care Liability
Reform Act of 1997, which sought to impose stricter requirements on
health care liability claims. 2 6 The bill was sent to the House
27
Committee on the Judiciary but never made it back to the House.
In more recent years, Congress introduced a sequence of Help
Efficient, Accessible, Low Cost, Timely Health Care (HEALTH)
Acts; the bills, introduced in 2002, 2003, and 2004, sought to
increase accessibility and quality of health care by reducing the
burden of medical liability through the enactment of a $250,000 noneconomic damage cap in medical malpractice liability cases. 28 All
Alec Shelby Bayer, Looking Beyond the East Fix and Delving into the Roots
of the Real Medical Malpractice Crisis, 5 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 111, 115
(2005).
21

22 Id.

23

Id. at 124-25.

24

Medical Malpractice Rx Act, H.R. 2242, 106th Cong. (1999).

25 Id.
26

Health Care Liability Reform Act, H.R. 5119, 106th Cong. (2000).

27 Id.

Help Efficient, Accessible, Low Cost, Timely Health Care (HEALTH) Act
of 2002, H.R. 4600, 107th Cong. (2002); Help Efficient, Accessible, Low Cost,
Timely Health Care (HEALTH) Act of 2003, H.R. 5, 108th Cong. (2003); Help
28
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three acts were eventually passed by the House and sent to the
Committee on the Judiciary but they were never voted on in the
Senate. 29 The HEALTH Act of 2005 has once again revived the
$250,000 non-economic damage
cap in medical malpractice suits,
30
fate.
its
see
to
wait
we
and
Aside from caps on non-economic damages, Congress has
recognized that there are other probable approaches to solving the
malpractice crisis and has proposed legislation to curb medical
malpractice litigation in other ways. In 2004, Congress proposed the
Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act (LARA). 31 The Act sought to restore
the power of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in order
to deter frivolous lawsuits and forum shopping. 32 More specifically,
LARA sought to restore Rule 1l's mandatory sanctions to remove its
'safe harbor' provision so that parties and attorneys could no longer
avoid sanctions by withdrawing frivolous claims, to allow monetary
and other sanctions for abuses of the discovery process, and to apply
a 'three strikes and you're out' rule to attorneys who commit Rule 11
violations in Federal courts. 3 3 The Act was proposed following
expressed concern that frivolous litigation, medical malpractice cases
included, was out of control and needed to be mitigated.34 The
assumption was that stricter standards could prevent frivolous
medical malpractice lawsuits that caused increased premiums for
doctors and patients.35 LARA, like the HEALTH Acts, was passed in
the House, read twice in 36the Senate, and is currently with the
Committee on the Judiciary.
Congress has also taken steps to prevent medical malpractice
Efficient, Accessible, Low Cost, Timely Health Care (HEALTH) Act of 2004, H.R.
4280, 108th Cong. (2003).
29 Help Efficient, Accessible, Low Cost, Timely Health Care (HEALTH) Act
of 2002, H.R. 4600, 107th Cong. (2002); Efficient, Accessible, Low Cost, Timely
Health Care (HEALTH) Act of 2003, H.R. 5, 108th Cong. (2003); Efficient,
Accessible, Low Cost, Timely Health Care (HEALTH) Act of 2004, H.R. 4280,
108th Cong. (2003).
30 Help Efficient, Accessible, Low Cost, Timely Health Care (HEALTH) Act
of 2005, H.R. 534, 109th Cong. (2005).
31 Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act (LARA), H.R. 4571, 108th Cong. (2004).
32

H.R. REP. No. 108-682, at 3 (2004).

33 id.

34 id.
31 Id. at 5.
36 H.R. 4571.
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through health care education for consumers. In 2005, Congress
introduced House Bill 568, the Patient Empowerment and Education
Act of 2005. 3 The Act sought to educate health care consumers
through public service announcements, patient safety workshops, and
community outreach programs on how to safeguard themselves from
medical malpractice.
Counseling and peer support services to
victims and family members of medical malpractice were also
included in the Act. 39 The bill is currently with the Subcommittee on
Education Reform.40
B. State Non-Economic Damage Cap Legislation and Concerns
States have also attempted to address the medical malpractice
crisis by implementing their own legislation. California was one of
the first states to spearhead legislation to cap non-economic damages
through its Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975
(MICRA), which capped non-economic damages at $250,000.41 A
large group of states followed with similar tort reform in the 1970s,
1980s and 1990s. 42 In fact, over the last ten years, two thirds of states
have passed tort reform limiting or restricting medical malpractice
lawsuits.43 Since the year 2000 alone, eight states have enacted
substantial tort reform legislation that includes caps for noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases. 4 However, in states
where statutes limiting non-economic damages have been enacted,
courts have often scrutinized the constitutionality of the legislation,
and some have overturned the capping legislation.

37 Patient Empowerment and Education Act of 2005, H.R. 568, 109th Cong. §
3 (2005).
38 Id.

39

Id. at § 3(b)(3).

40 H.R. 568.
41

Sharkey, supra note 2, at 393.

42

Id. at 394.

43 Boehm, supra note 13, at 357.
44Id.
45

id.

2005]

Non-Economic Damage Cap of the HEALTHAct

91

1. Jurisdictions That Have Found Caps on Non-Economic
Damages Unconstitutional
Courts have found the constitutionality of non-economic
damages caps the most controversial in light of equal protection and
the jury's duty to assess damages.46 States that passed legislation to
cap non-economic damages in medical malpractice cases argue that
the caps are constitutional because they rationally relate to a
legitimate state interest, reduce medical malpractice premiums to
doctors, and in turn decrease future insurance costs to health care
consumers. 47 Courts in other states disagree.
The purpose of equal protection is to prohibit class legislation
from arbitrarily discriminating "against some and favoring others in
like circumstances. 48 State courts have often looked to whether noneconomic damage caps discriminate against those who are severely
injured and otherwise entitled to more than what the cap allows.
Courts traditionally apply a "rational basis test," whereby "legislation
is presumed to be constitutional and will survive review if the
classification scheme is rationally related to a legitimate
governmental

purpose.

49

For example, the Supreme Court of

Alabama in Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Association looked to
"whether the connection between the benefit sought to be conferred
50
on society and the means employed to accomplish it."
The Moore court held that a statute imposing non-economic
damage caps created a favored class of tortfeasors based on their
connections with health care. 51 Citing to several empirical studies,
the court concluded that the correlation between the non-economic
damage cap imposed, and the health care costs to citizens was "at
best indirect and remote. 52 Furthermore, the court held that "the
statute operates to the advantage not only of negligent health care
providers over other tortfeasors, but of those health care providers
46

Carol A. Crocca, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of

State Statutory Provisions Limiting Amount of Recovery in Medical Malpractice
Claims, 26 A.L.R.5th 245, §§ 3(b), 5(b) (2005).

47 Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665, 680 (Cal. 1985).
48 Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 165 (Ala. 1991).
49 Zdrojewski v. Murphy, 657 N.W.2d 721, 738 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002).
50 Moore, 592 So. 2d at 167.

"' Id. at 166-67, 169, Crocca, supra note 46, at § 3(b).
52 Moore, 592 So. 2d at 168.
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who are most irresponsible." 53 Likewise, the Illinois Supreme Court
in Wright v. Central DuPage Hospital overturned a state provision
that capped non-economic damages in medical malpractice claims at
$500,000 on the grounds that the provision was arbitrary and
constituted a special law that was unconstitutional.54
Similarly, the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Carson v.
Maurer found that the limitations on non-economic damages prevents
adequate compensation to patients with meritorious claims and offers
nothing to eliminate non-meritorious claims. 55 The limitation
distinguishes between "malpractice victims with non-economic losses
that exceed $250,000, and those with less egregious non-economic
losses. 56 The court concluded that "restrictions on recovery may
encourage physicians to enter into practice and remain in practice5 7
but do so only at the expense of claimants with meritorious claims."
State courts have also recognized that "the right to a trial by
jury is a fundamental constitutionally guaranteed right" and therefore
"a jury's verdict may not be set aside unless the verdict is flawed,
thereby losing its constitutional guaranteed protection." 58 In fact,
some courts have been reluctant to interfere with a jury's award of
non-economic damages and punitive damages. For example, the
Moore court held that the authority to interfere with a jury's findings
on the amount of damages should be exercised with great caution5
particularly in cases involving imprecise measurements of damages.
Moreover, the court believed that a jury's "constitutionally protected
factfindingfunction" is impaired by the damages limitation because it
"prevents the jury from applying the facts. The court stated that a
jury's assessment may be changed only when it is flawed by "bias,
passion, prejudice, corruption, or improper motive" leaving it no
longer constitutional. 6 '

" Id. at 169.
54 Wright v. Central DuPage Hospital, 63 Ill.2d 313, 329-30 (1976), Crocca,
supra note 46, at § 17(b).
55 Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 837 (N.H. 1980).
56 Id. at 837.
57 id.
58

Moore, 592 So. 2d at 161.

'9 Moore, 592 So. 2d at 160, Crocca supra note 46, at § 5(b).
Moore, 592 So. 2d at 164.

60

61

Moore, 592 So. 2d at 160, Crocca supra note 46, at § 5(b).
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2. Jurisdictions that Found Non-Economic Damage Caps
Constitutional
Alternatively, other courts have held provisions capping noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases constitutional. Some
courts that have upheld statutes capping non-economic damages on
equal protection grounds concluded that non-economic damage caps
on medical malpractice cases further a legitimate governmental
purpose. Applying the rational basis test, the California Supreme
Court in Fein held that a statute limiting non-economic damages did
not violate equal protection because it did not limit a victim's
recovery for out-of-pocket medical expenses and lost earnings and
was "rationally related to a legitimate state interest." 62 The court
reasoned that by enacting legislation to cap non-economic damages,
the legislature was acting in response to the rising costs of medical
malpractice insurance which threatened to "curtail the availability of
medical care in some parts of the state and creating the ... possibility
that many doctors would practice without insurance, leaving patients
who might be injured by such doctors with the prospect of
uncollectible judgments." 63 Additionally, in regard to the pain and
suffering aspect of non-economic damages, the court held that
"money damages are at best only imperfect compensation for such
intangible injuries and such dama es are generally passed on to, and
borne by, innocent consumers. ' 6 Furthermore, the court reasoned
that it is difficult for medical malpractice plaintiffs to collect
judgments for any of their damages, pecuniary and non-pecuniary,
and that it was in the public interest "to attempt
to obtain some costs
6
savings by limiting non-economic damages."
Similarly, in Zdrojewski v. Murphy, the Michigan Appellate
Court applied a traditional rational basis test to a statute capping noneconomic damages and held that because it was rationally related to a
legitimate government pur ose the statute did not violate a plaintiffs
right to equal protection. The purpose of the statute was to control
62

Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665, 683 (Cal. 1985), Crocca,

supra note 46, at § 3(a).
63 Fein, 695 P.2d at 680.
64

Id. at 681.

65

id.

66

Zdrojewski v. Murphy, 657 N.W.2d 721, 739 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002),
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the increases in health care costs by reducing liability of the medical
provider and malpractice insurance premiums, while maintaining
affordable health care in the state. 67 The court affirmed the lower
court ruling that "controlling
health care costs is a legitimate
68
governmental purpose."
Courts have also upheld caps on non-economic damages on
due process grounds. The California Supreme Court held that as long
as the measure is rationally related to a legitimate state interest, the
legislature has broad power to determine the measure and timing of
damages. 69 "[W]e know of no principle of California-or
federal-constitutional law which prohibits the Legislature from
limiting the recovery of damages70 in a particular setting in order to
further a legitimate state interest."
Finally, some courts have held that non-economic damage
caps in medical malpractice cases do not violate the right to a jury's
assessment of damages, and that "in certain circumstances, a trial
court may reduce a jury verdict without violating the right to a jury
determination of damages." 7' In Zdrojewski v. Murphy, the plaintiff
appeared to challenge the right of the legislature to limit her remedy
and contended that the Constitution "guarantees her not only the right
to have a jury determine her damages, but the unfettered right to
recover precisely what the jury awarded." 72 The court disagreed with
the plaintiff and held that the legislature has the authority to limit
remedies in tort actions. The court further noted that the limitations of
the statute impeded neither on the plaintiffs ability to present her
case to a jury nor the jury's ability to determine the factual extent of
plaintiff's damages.
Additionally, The Missouri Supreme Court in Adams v.
Children's Mercy Hospital held that under common law, 73
a
substantive right for a jury to determine damages does not exist.
The Adams court concluded that the cap on non-economic damages
Crocca, supra note 46, at § 3(a).
67

Zdrojewski, 657 N.W.2d at 738.

68 id.

Fein, 695 P.2d at 680.
70 Id. at 682.
69

71

Zdrojewski, 657 N.W.2d at 737.

Id. at 736.
73 Adams v. Children's Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d 898, 907 (Mo. 1992),
Crocca, supra note 46, at § 5(a).
72
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did not infringe on the right to a jury trial because what constitutes a
permissible remedy is a matter of law, and the court applies the
the jury completes its
limitation on non-economic damages only after
74
damages.
determining
of
task
constitutional
3. Medical Malpractice Reforms in Illinois
The Illinois Supreme Court has twice thrown out state laws
limiting damages in the last three decades. 75 In 1976, the noneconomic damage cap for medical malpractice cases was declared
unconstitutional by the Illinois Supreme Court in Wright v. Central
Du Page Hospital.76 Two decades later, in 1997, the court also
rejected a state law that placed a $500,000 on non-economic damages
in all tort lawsuits. 77 Recently, in August 2005, the governor of
Illinois signed into law Senate Bill 475, a new medical malpractice
reform bill. 78 The purpose of the bill is to prevent physicians
practicing in high-risk specialties and facing high medical
malpractice insurance premiums from leaving Illinois, as has been the
case in recent years.7 9 The bill hopes to achieve this through
increased state oversight of physicians, increased state regulation of
medical liability insurance carriers, reduction of frivolous medical
litigation, and enforcement of caps on non-economic
malpractice
80
damages.
In hopes of curbing medical malpractice premiums, the new
legislation limits non-economic damages against physicians to
$500,000 and non-economic damages against hospitals to
$1,000,000.81 Additionally, the bill expands health care accessibility
by providing immunity, except for willful and wanton misconduct,
Adams, 832 S.W.2d at 907.
75 Christi Parsons, Trial Lawyers Target Cap on Malpractice,CHI. TRIB., Aug.
25, 2005, at Cl.
76 Wright v. Cent. DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 736 (Ill. 1976).
14

Parsons, supra note 75.
78 I11 S.B. 475, Pub. L. No. 94-0677 (codified in scattered sections of 215 I11.
Comp. Stat., the Illinois Insurance Code, 225 Ill. Comp. Stat, the Medical Practice
Act of 1987, and 735 I11. Comp. Stat. § 5/2-1706.5) (effective Aug. 25, 2005);
Parsons, supra note 75.
79 Parsons, supra note 75.
77

80 111. S.B. 475 § 101.
8'

Id. at § 2-1706.5 (codified at 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/2-1706.5).
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beyond free medical clinics, to retired physicians who provide free
medical services and imposes harsher punishments and disincentives
for malpractice.82
In order to reduce frivolous lawsuits, the bill requires that
before a case can be brought against a physician or hospital, another
doctor must certify that the action has merit. 83 Additionally, the new
legislation institutes the "Sorry Works!" pilot program requiring
hospitals and physicians to promptly acknowledge and apologize for
mistakes in patient care and promptly offer fair settlements. 84 The
new legislation also helps health care consumers by increasing the
statute of limitations from five to ten years for disciplinary actions
and requires that the Illinois Department of Financial and
Professional Regulation publish doctors' public profile and
disciplinary actions on the Internet for health care consumers. 85
Finally, the legislation hopes to stabilize medical malpractice
prices through increased competition between insurance companies.
Under SB 475, the Secretary of the Department of Financial and
Professional Regulation is authorized, in some instances, to deny
increases in medical malpractice rate increases. 86 Ifan insurance
company files a request for a medical malpractice insurance rate
increase greater than six percent, public hearings on the proposed
increase will be mandatory. 87 By controlling increases in medical
malpractice rates, the law intends to make the malpractice insurance
business more competitive, and therefore more attractive to
companies
feltrates.
closed
out. 88 It is hoped that increased
competition that
will have
stabilize
89

82

Id. at § 30 (codified as amended at 745 Ill.
Comp. Stat. § 49/30).

83 Id. at

§ 2-622 (codified at 735 1I1. Comp. Stat. § 5/2-622).

84

Id. at § 405.

85

11. S.B. 475, Pub. L. No. 94-0677 § 22 (codified as amended at 225 Ill.

Comp. Stat. 60/220, Id.at § 24.1 (codified at 225 Il. Comp. Stat. 60/24.1).
86 Id. at § 155.18 (codified as amended at 225 Il1. Comp. Stat. 5/155.18).
17

Id. at § 115.18(c)(2).

Press Release, Ill. Office of the Governor, Gov. Blagojevich Signs Medical
MalpracticeReform: Legislation Designed to Improve Access to Physician Care in
Illinois (Aug. 25, 2005) (on file with author).
88

89 Id.
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III. The HEALTH Act of 2005
On the national level, Congress has proposed the HEALTH
Act of 2005 in an attempt to lower the costs of health care liability,
ensure only meritorious health care injury claims, improve
availability of health care services, and provide an increased sharing
of information in the health care system. 90 The purposes of the bill
are to lower unintended injury and improve patient care through
implementing "reasonable, comprehensive, and effective" health care
liability reforms. 9' Such improvements aim to ensure receipt of fair
and adequate compensation by people with meritorious health care
injury claims, improve fairness and cost effectiveness of the current
sharing
health care liability system, and
92 provide greater information
system.
care
health
the
within
The Act sets forth three key reasons as to why our nation's
health care liability system needs reform. First, the current justice
system adversely affects patients' access to health care services,
improved patient care, and efficient health care costs. 93 Second, that
the health care liability litigation system negatively affects interstate
commerce by contributing to the high cost of health care and
premiums for health care liability insurance. 94 Third, the large
number of individuals who receive government health care benefits
and the large number of health care providers who provide items or
affect on the amount, distribution, and use
services have a significant
9 of federal funds.

The HEALTH Act of 2005, like its predecessors, limits
recovery to medical malpractice victims. The legislation establishes a
$250,000 limitation on non-economic damages, but not economic
damages, in health care liability cases. 96 Punitive damages may be
awarded in states that allow for them but "only if it is proven by clear
and convincing evidence that such person acted with malicious intent
to injure the claimant or that such person deliberately failed to avoid
unnecessary injury that such person knew the claimant was
90 H.R. 534 § 2(a)(2), 109th Cong. (2005).
91 Id. at § 2(b).
92

Id.

9' Id. at § 2(a)(1).

94 Id. at § 2(a)(2).
9' H.R. 534 § 2(a)(3).
96

Id. at § 4(b)-(c).
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substantially certain to suffer." 97 Punitive damages are capped at
$250,000 or twice the amount of economic damages, whichever is
greater. 98 Additionally the jury is not to be informed of the maximum
award for non-economic damages or if applicable, punitive
damages. 99 In determining punitive damages, the trier of fact must
consider only the severity and duration of harm caused by the
defendant, the profitability of action to the doctor, the medical
procedure rendered, the potential criminal penalties imposed, and the
amount of any civil fines assessed against the party as a result of the
conduct. 1°° Furthermore, the Act abolishes joint and several-liability
in medical malpractice cases so that
10 1 defendants are only responsible
for their own percentage of fault.
In an effort to maximize victims' compensation under the new
legislation, the Act also stipulates fixed percentages of attorneys'
contingency fees, depending on the level of total monetary
recovery.
Contingency fees must adhere to the following
limitations:
(1) 40 percent of the first $50,000 recovered by the
claimant(s).
(2) 33 1/3 percent of the next $50,000 recovered by the
claimant(s).
(3) 25 percent of the next $500,000 recovered by the
claimant(s).
(4) 50 percent of any amount by which the recovery by the
claimant(s) is in excess of $600,000. 103
The Act not only aims to lower medical malpractice
premiums by enforcing damage caps but also encourages speedy
resolution of claims.' 0 4 The legislation sets the statute of limitations

9' Id. at § 7(a)
98 Id. at § 7(b)(2).
99 Id. at § 4(c). (requiring that when the award is in excess of $250,000, it must
be reduced either before the entry of judgment, or by amendment of the judgment
after entry of judgment, and such reduction must be made before accountting for
any other reduction in damages required by law).
100 H.R. 534 § 7(b)(1)(A)-(F)
'0' Id. at § 4(d). (indicating that the trier of fact is responsible for
proportioning each party's percentage of fault).
102 Id. at § 5(a).
103

Id.

'04

Id. at § 3.
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to three years after manifestation of0 5the date of injury or one year
after the patient discovers the injury.'

IV. ANALYSIS
A. Overall Effectiveness of Damage Caps Imposed Under the
HEALTH Act of 2005
Although some studies have shown that tort
reform may
lower medical malpractice premiums, the evidence as to which
particular elements of the reform actually lower premiums is heavily
debated. Many states that previously suffered from medical
malpractice crises have already passed legislation with reforms
similar to those in the HEALTH Act. 106 Some of these states have
seen slower growth in medical malpractice premium prices than
states that did not enact damage caps.' 0 7 It is possible that the
implementation of the HEALTH Act may slow the growth rate of
medical malpractice premiums but not necessarily lower the
malpractice premium levels. The damage caps proposed to benefit
physicians and consumers may result in increased revenues for
insurance companies at the expense of those who benefit the most
from non-economic damages--the most severely injured medical
malpractice victims.08
One certain and expected result of damage caps is that
insurance companies will suffer smaller losses. 10 9 Recent research by
Kip Viscusi and Patricia Born found that insurance companies' losses
in states that have enacted caps on non-economic damages have been
reduced by sixteen to seventeen percent compared to states without
such measures.11 0 Furthermore, insurance companies in states that
enacted tort reform, other than non-economic damage caps,
experienced losses that were twenty-four to twenty-five percent less
105

H.R. 534 § 3.

U.S. Gen. Accountability Office, Publ'n No. GAO-03-702, Medical
Malpractice Insurance: Multiple Factors have Contributed to Increased Premium
Rates, at 15-16 (June 2003).
106

107

Id.

108

Boehm, supra note 13, at 361.
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W. Kip Viscusi & Patricia H. Born, Damage Caps, Insurability, and the

Performanceof Medical MalpracticeInsurance, 72 J. RISK & INS. 23, 32 (2005).
110 Id.
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than states that did not enact additional measures." l l However,
whether damage caps will lead to lower insurance premiums is
controversial, given the variations across data used in empirical
studies, and the difficulties in isolating the effects of non-economic
damage 12caps when other sorts of tort reform have also been
enacted.
B. Effectiveness of Damage Caps in Lowering Medical
Malpractice Premiums
The main issue surrounding the proposed legislation's
objective, to lower physicians' medical malpractice premiums and
increase consumers' access to health care, is its underlying
assumption that a causal relationship exists between premium prices
and the actual scope and magnitude of medical malpractice lawsuits.
It is true that states that have enacted previous caps on noneconomic damages did experience a slower growth in medical
malpractice premiums. 113 In fact, a 2003 study by the Government
Accountability Office ("GAO") reported that states with legislative
caps on non-economic damages and where applicable, punitive
damages, experienced an average percentage growth in premium
rates of slightly less than ten percent compared with twenty-nine
percent in states without non-economic damage caps. 14
Nevertheless, the GAO cautioned against making causal arguments15
that the damage caps cause lower malpractice insurance premiums."
The GAO's concern is supported by evidence that malpractice
insurance fell below the national average in sixteen out of thirty-one
states without damage caps.1 6 However, seventeen out of the
"' Id. at 30-32 (stating that other reforms include limits on attorney
contingency fees, modifications to joint and several liability rules, establishment of
requirements for structured and periodic payments, fees for frivolous lawsuits, and
modifications of the collateral source rule).
112 Zeiler, supra note 1, at 392.
113

Sharkey, supra note 2, at 408 (citing to the August 2003 GAO study

covering Florida, Mississippi, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia).
114

Id.

15 Id. (explaining that multiple factors that affect premiums make it hard to
statistically justify that damage caps really lower premiums).
116 Kevin J. Conway, Tort Reform Won't Lower Malpractice Premiums, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 11, 2005, at 14.
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nineteen states with damage caps have raised their medical
malpractice premium rates, and in half of the states where caps have
increased insurance rates, such increases have been above the
national average.' 1 7 Despite statutory reform, total medical
malpractice costs for
8 physicians and hospitals increased at a higher
rate than inflation."
It is difficult to directly measure the influence of noneconomic damage caps because there are multiple factors that impact
medical malpractice premium levels.' 19 According to the GAO, other
factors that have contributed to increases in medical malpractice
premiums in the past include "insurers' losses, declines in investment
income a less competitive climate, and climbing reinsurance
rates. ' 2° Furthermore, a report completed in 2003, by Weiss Ratings,
Inc., an independent rating agency for insurance companies,
identifies several factors driving up premiums, each of which may
have a greater impact on premiums than the presence or absence of
caps. 12 1 These factors include inflation of medical costs, the
insurance market's cyclical nature, the need to shore up reserve for
policies in force, a decline in investment income, overall financial
22
safety considerations, and the supply and demand of coverage.'
Also, the presence of other sorts of tort reform makes it difficult to
isolate effects of non-economic damage caps.' 23 More importantly,
empirical work that relies on simple regression analysis can be
problematic if the implementation of caps is endogenous to perceived
market conditions that are related to medical malpractice
124
premiums.
theseisreasons,
reliance
25 on the empirical results of
most statisticalFor
studies
controversial.

117

Id.

118

Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 167 (Ala. 1991) (citing

to a GAO study which suggested remote relationship between damage caps and
total cost of health care), Crocca, supra note 46, at § 3(b).
119

Zeiler, supra note 1,at 390.

120

U.S. Gen. Accountability Office, supra note 106, at 6.

121 Lucinda Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children, &

the Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263, 1272 (2004).
122 Id.

123 Zeiler, supra note 1, at 392.
124 Id. at 393 (discussing an explanation by Professor Albert Yoon as to the
problems with simple regression analysis).
125Id. at 390.
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Some experts argue that increases in insurance rates are
responses to the broader economic cycle and not out-of-control jury
verdicts. 126 Insurance profits are derived from investment income, or
the investment of the paid premiums in a "float.' 127 In a "soft
market," where the investment market is strong and interest rates are
high, insurance companies profit significantly by investing in float
and may under price policies to attract more money from premiums
to invest. 128 When the market declines or interest rates drop in a
"hard market," insurance companies may raise rates in efforts to
curtail coverage. 29 In hard markets, insurance rates for doctors
increase significantly while claims and payouts remained flat.' 30 As
recently as 2004, insurers continued to raise premiums, including in
states where tort reform was enacted, even though claims and payouts
have dropped and investment markets have begun to improve.
Other reports also provide mixed results regarding the
significance of non-economic caps on malpractice premiums. The
variance in results is likely caused by difficulties in measuring the
influence of caps on medical malpractice insurance due to the
multiple factors that potentially cause increases in malpractice
premiums. 132 The significance of the effects of non-economic
damage caps on premiums differs across studies when different
factors thought to affect medical malpractice premiums are controlled
for in the empirical analysis.' 33 Research by Professor Frank Sloan
found that damage caps did not significantly affect premiums or
annual percentage change in premiums for doctors in any of the three
fields of medicine tested.13 Another study by Born and Viscusi
controlled for differences in state regulation of insurers and found
that non-economic damages did not significantly affect medical
malpractice premiums. 135 Similarly, Professor Vasanthakumar Bhat
126

Boehm, supra note 13, at 364-65.

127

Id. at 364.

128

Id.

129

Id. at 364-65.

130 Id.

132

Boehm, supra note 13, at 365.
Zeiler, supra note 1, at 392.

133

Id. at 391.

134

id.

135

Id.
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found that including both non-economic and economic damage caps
as explanatory variables significantly decreased the price of
premiums. 136 Nevertheless, when only non-economic damage caps
were controlled
for, there was no significant affect on premium
137
levels.
A more recent study, conducted by Professor Catherine
Sharkey found that once the severity of the injury and other sociodemographic variables were controlled for, non-economic damage
caps had little or no affect on the size of overall compensatory
damage verdicts or judgments. 138 Sharkey's findings suggest that in
cases of severe injury in states where non-economic damage caps are
enacted, greater economic damages are awarded
in order to
39
damages.'
non-economic
smaller
for
compensate
C. The Constitutionality and Impact of Punitive Damages
Many critics also suggest that punitive damage reform may
have little or no affect at all on medical malpractice insurance.
Some states simply do not recognize punitive damages, while others
do not insure against punitive damages.' 4 ' Medical malpractice cases
make up a much smaller proportion of punitive awards than liability,
fraud, and intentional tort cases. 142 Furthermore, punitive awards in
medical malpractice cases are very seldom awarded and are often
reduced on appeal. 143 The tension surrounding punitive damage caps
lies between the fact that punitive damages have not met their
legislative intent in lowering medical malpractice premiums, and in
the more broader view of the Supreme Court that punitive damages
need to be controlled.
Statistical research shows that where punitive damage caps
are imposed, insurance companies experience lower payouts and
136

Id. at 392 (defining premiums in the study as rate of payment per

physician).
137 Zeiler, supra note 1, at 391-92.
Sharkey, supra note 2, at 464, 469 (comparing the experience of states that
have enacted non-economic damage caps and those that have not).
139 Id. at 469.
138

140

Viscusi, supra note 109, at 19.

141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
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increase in profits, at the expense of lower medical malpractice
premiums.144- Viscusi and Born found that in states where punitive
damage reform was enacted, insurance companies at the 50th, 7 5th,
and 90th percentiles of the distribution of losses experienced
significantly fewer losses. 145 They also found that in states where
punitive damages reform or overall tort reform was enacted,
insurance companies experienced an overall increase in profits. 146 in
theory, the decrease in payouts should have resulted in smaller
barriers to entry, lead to increased competition from other insurance
companies, and lower the medical malpractice premiums for
doctors. 14 7 Contrary to that theory, punitive damages only helped the
insurance companies.
While it may seem that the punitive damage caps have not
met their legislative intent to lower health care costs, and should
therefore be deemed unconstitutional, recent Supreme Court rulings,
including that of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
v. Campbell suggest that punitive damages, unlike non-economic
damages, should not be treated as a matter of fact for the jury. 148 In
fact, the Court in State Farm reiterated as it did in previous cases that
"to the extent an award is grossly excessive, it furthers no legitimate
purpose and constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of property."
As a
result, courts already engage in "exacting" review of punitive
damages to ensure they are not grossly excessive. 50 In light of this
broader view punitive damage caps may be valid.
D. Constitutionality of the Damage Caps Imposed in the
HEALTH Act.
Despite the debated causal relationship between noneconomic damage caps in medical malpractice cases, and their
desired result of lowering medical malpractice premiums for doctors

'44

Id. at 34.

145

Viscusi, supra note 109, at 34.

146

Id. at 38.

147 Id.
148

Paul

Decamp, Beyond State Farm: Due Process Constraints on

NonEconomic Compensatory Damages, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 231, 290
(2003).
149 Id. at 287.
ISo Id. at 290.
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and health care costs consumers, some find the caps to be
constitutional. According to some courts, the jury maintains its
function as finder of fact and assessor of damages because economic
damages can still be collected without limitation.' 51 Without notice of
the limitation on damages, the jury subjectively calculates noneconomic damages by assessing a price on the pain and suffering of
the victim.152 Courts apply the limitation on non-economic damages
only after the jury had completed its duty of fact finding and
assessing damages.' 53 The two roles supplement each other and do
not infringe on the other's duty. 154 Because juries will not know
about the limitation on non-economic damages until after they assess
all damages, their assessment should be unbiased. Unless the jury's
assessment is greater than the maximum, the cap will not be
implemented.
In some state courts, non-economic damage caps have been
upheld on equal protection grounds on the premise that the limit
worked towards a public policy interest. 155 The cap is seen to control
increases in health care costs by reducing liability of the medical
provider, reducing malpractice156insurance premiums, and maintaining
affordable health care in state.
Uncertainty raised by statistical studies regarding the
lowering of medical malpractice insurance raises doubt as to whether
the damage caps invoked under the HEALTH Act will work towards
a public policy interest.157 The uncertainty also raises questions of
accessibility and affordability of health care to consumers if the caps
are enacted. For the most severely injured victims, economic
damages may not offer equal protection because the pain and
suffering endured is likely valued much higher than the $250,000
non-economic damage cap of the HEALTH Act. As the Moore court

151

Crocca, supra note 46, at § 5(a).

152

Id.

153 Id.
154 id.

155 Id. at § 3(a), Zdrojewski v. Murphy, 657 N.W.2d 721, 739 (Mich. 2002).

Crocca, supra note 46, at § 3(a); Zdrojewski, 657 N.W.2d at 739, See infra
Part II.B (discussing cases addressing the constitutionality of caps on noneconomic damages).
157 See Crocca, supra note 46, at § 3(a) (using the holding of Zdrojewski to
show that a statute meets equal protection if it serves a legitimate government
interest); Zdrojewski, 657 N.W.2d at 739.
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stated, the "statute operates to the advantage not only of negligent
heath care providers over other tortfeasors, but of those providers
who are most irresponsible."158
The lack of equal protection may be even truer for states that
do not impose punitive damages, such as Illinois. While the
HEALTH Act also caps punitive damages, it does not impose them in
states that do not already recognize such damages in medical
malpractice cases. 159 In states where no punitive damages are
imposed, the non-economic damage cap will further skew
compensation to favor those who are relatively less deserving of the
maximum $250,000 non-economic damage cap. Indeed, the most
severely injured victim may receive the same maximum $250,000
non-economic damages as a victim who is less severely injured
despite the greater severity of the injury.
E. Alternative Solutions
The lack of clarity of a significant relationship between
damage caps and medical malpractice premium levels suggests that
an alternative solution may be more effective. One such solution is
stronger regulation of the insurance industry.' 60 Insurance regulation
reform has successfully prevented large rate increases in California
since 1988.61 Similarly, one component of Illinois' recently passed
SB 475 permits the state in select instances to deny increases in
medical malpractice rate increases. 62 Accordingly, coalitions and
organizations such as the Americans for Insurance Reform
recommended a number of ways to better regulate the insurance
industry. The recommendations include: undertaking a review of rate
levels to determine if rates are excessive, initiating an investigation
into anti-competitive behavior, calling a rate hearing if an insurer
files a rate request in excess of current inflation, beginning a careful
158 Moore

v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 169 (Ala. 1991)

(emphasis added).
159H.R. 534 § 7(a), 109th Cong. (2005).
160 Boehm, supra note 13, at 368.
Id. at 369, Californians Allied for Patient Protection, California'sMedical
Injury Compensation Reform Act, available at http://www.micra.org/
MICRAprovisions.pdf (last visited Oct. 11, 2005) (summarizing California's
Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act limiting non-economic damages to
$250,000, attorneys' contingency fees, and the statute of limitations on injury
claims).
162 IlI. S.B. 475, Pub. L. No. 94-0677 (effective Aug. 25, 2005).
161
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analysis as to what led to this most recent cycle or period of increases
in medical malpractice premiums and the state insurance
commissioner's department's role in it by allowing rates to fluctuate
between excessive and inadequate, and alerting the legislature to the
end of the hard market
and advise them that there is no need to rush
63
into legislative fixes.'
Another alternative to the proposed damage caps is to have
managed care providers disclose to theii current and prospective
enrollees the terms of their contracts with physicians.164 Since
patients operate under imperfect information when assessing whether
their injury was truly caused by negligent behavior on the part of the
physician, the disclosure of contract terms would lower the barrier of
imperfect information.' 65 If patients know the type of fee for service
arrangement between managed care organizations and the physician,
they will have a better idea of whether they were provided with more
or less expensive treatment.' 66 This information could potentially
resolve some of the uncertainty surrounding malpractice when a
patient decides whether or not to pursue costly litigation.' 6' The
downside to disclosure is that trade secrets of competing managing
care organizations would be revealed, which 6 8could lead to less
innovative contracts for physicians in the future.'
Additionally, in 2003, the American Medical Association
endorsed the concept of state legislation for a "health court"
system. 169 The proposal included pretrial screening panels typically
consisting of three physicians and a lawyer that would make factual
determinations as to whether the provider's acts or omissions caused
the patient's injury and whether the patient shared equal or greater
blame for any negligence. 170 The conclusions by the panel would be
admissible in a later trial before a health court. "71 In response to

163
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previous medical malpractice crises in the 1970s and 1980s, at least
thirty-four states passed laws creating screening panels.' 72 Currently,
however, only a half-dozen of mandatory systems that include
admissible results remain, while the others were either declared
unconstitutional or were repealed by legislature.' 73 A potential
constitutional problem arises because the model requires the panel to
issue a written opinion that would be admissible regarding whether
malpractice occurred and who is at fault. 174 The focus of the opinion
is very similar to the factual findings that juries have been left to
determine, which could violate the Seventh Amendment.' 75 In fact,
some states have declared the panels unconstitutional. Perhaps a less
extreme alternative with a similar purpose as the health court is
having a physician certify that an action has merit before the case can
be brought against a doctor or a hospital, as is the case in Illinois,
under its recently passed legislation.
Finally, proposed legal reforms not limited to medical
malpractice tort cases may also be suitable alternatives to noneconomic damage caps. One such reform requires courts to better
inform jurors of the range of non-economic compensatory damages
that prior juries have awarded in factually comparable cases. 176 To
the extent that the Seventh Amendment continues to require that the
amount of non-economic damages be treated as a fact, juries should
be provided with evidence that can permit that to make a reasoned
valuation of the harms at issue.I17 Courts should provide juries with a
range of awards for injuries that are factually comparable to those
harms that the plaintiff claims to have suffered
178 so that juries can
make reasoned valuations of the harms at issue.
A related reform requires trial courts to exercise de novo
review of the verdict for excessiveness when the jury has returned17a9
that exceeds the range established by comparable cases.
verdict
Such a standard of review is similar to the Supreme Court's
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recognition in tort cases that the amount of punitive damages,
although a factual matter, may be deemed unconstitutionally
excessive by the court when the award exceeds what the law will
allow, or becomes an "arbitrary deprivation of property."' 80 In regard
to non-economic compensatory damages, the relevant objective
standard should be dictated by the body of factually comparative
precedents.' 8'
V.

CONSUMER IMPACT

The impact of the proposed non-economic damage caps under
the HEALTH Act on health care consumers is uncertain given the
preponderance of empirical evidence that non-economic damage caps
have no significant effect in driving down health care costs. The
impact of the proposed damage cap will be experienced most by
severely injured tort victims and not by the hospitals or doctors that
the caps seek to impact. Since health care consumers benefit from the
spillover effects of lower medical malpractice insurance premiums,
the impact on consumers is dependent upon whether physicians will
actually pay lower malpractice insurance premiums, which in turns
depends on the insurance industry.
However, that is not to discredit the fact that medical
malpractice jury verdicts have increased over time in some states, and
that non-compensatory damages can constitute a large part of the
overall compensation. The 2003 GAO study recognized that since
1999, medical malpractice premium rates have increased significantly2
for physicians in some specialties in a number of states.11
Additionally, a 2004 RAND study of 257 medical malpractice cases
in California courts between 1995 and 1999 found that non-economic
damages constituted forty-two percent of the total aggregate damages
awarded before any MICRA deductions.' 83 The consequent impact
on public interests, especially the availability of insurance and
adequate health care at reasonable cost, drives the initiative for
reform
including
that of medical
malpractice
damage
Implicit
in imposing
non-economic
damage
caps is that
unlikecaps.'84
non-economic
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damages, economic damages are rational and predictable. 85
While non-economic damage caps may appear desirable in
light of public policy interests, the proposed legislation imposing
damage caps will likely have no affect on the vast majority of those
injured by medical malpractice because most never bring a claim. In
fact, only about one in eight of those injured choose to file a claim,
despite the fact that medical malpractice kills an estimated 195,000
hospital patients every year.' 86 Furthermore, in Illinois, the rate at
which medical malpractice claims are filed has remained stable for
the last ten years.
Although, the total number of claims filed
increased in Illinois, the number of filings per one hundred doctors
remained
the same once the number of physicians was adjusted
188
for.
The HEALTH Act of 2005 seeks a redundant objective. The
disincentive to bring frivolous medical malpractice already exists.
Rule 11 sanctions seek to deter frivolous lawsuits. Additionally, tort
lawyers typically work on a contingency fee basis, and generally fund
many cases themselves.' 89 It would not make economic sense to take
on a baseless case and invest in litigating it when the probability of
prevailing is so small that the expected outcome is smaller than the
initial investment.
Moreover, the proposed damage caps will most likely affect
access to attorneys for tortiously injured consumers. 190 The expected
outcome from a case is often defined as the product of the total
amount of damages and the probability that the physician performed
medical malpractice, also referred to as the likelihood that the injured
victim will prevail. 191 The abolishment of joint and several-liability
and enactment of non-economic and punitive damage caps are likely
to lower the expected outcome of litigation and result in attorneys
litigating fewer medical malpractice claims.

185
186
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For example, take two scenarios, one of a tort victim injured
by medical malpractice and another victim injured by a tort other
than medical malpractice. Assume that in both cases, the probability
of prevailing in court is the same. Also, assume that in both cases the
total damages would normally be the same, except that the damages
on the medical malpractice case are capped. For attorneys who
generally work on a contingency fee basis, there may be a
disincentive to pick up cases where the likelihood of prevailing is
even smaller because the total amount of damages will be smaller due
to both the non-economic and punitive damage caps. This may be
especially true in states that currently do not offer punitive damages,
such as Illinois. The attorney's stake in the case is reduced by the
damage caps and by limitations on attorneys' fees.
As a result, medical malpractice attorneys may choose not to
take a case even if the client suffered severe injuries. Estimates of
expected damages depend on the anticipated damage award and the
probability the patient will prevail. 192 The probability of prevailing
depends on the likelihood that the medical provider engaged in
noncompliant medical care. 193 Therefore, the greater the likelihood of
94
malpractice, the more likely an injured person will file a claim.'
However, a rational attorney will file a claim only if expected
damages exceed litigation costs. Where enacted damage caps and
limits on contingency fees may render a smaller expected outcome,
attorneys may turn down more cases because the cost of bringing the
case to court may exceed their expected recovery. In essence, the
proposed caps create incentives to discriminate against some medical
malpractice tort victims with severe injuries.
Furthermore, as long as medical malpractice premiums
remain high, which statistical research predicts, doctors will continue
to leave rural areas and stop practicing high-risk medicine in such
areas. Moreover, even if medical malpractice premiums do decrease
as a result of the non-economic damage caps, there is no guarantee
that Act's goal to curb the shortage of the rural consumers' access to
medical care will be resolved.'1 5 Rural health care shortage is a
global problem, including areas where there is no comparable U.S.
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civil justice system in its place.' 96 If doctors are leaving rural areas in
the United States, some will arguably continue to do so despite
stabilization of medical malpractice insurance premiums.
Finally, the reduction in liability exposure by non-economic
damage caps sometimes makes it optimal for doctors to "face
potential liability for medical malpractice rather than provide costly
treatment that complies with the legal standard of care." '1 97 If damage
caps reduce exposure to liability,
physicians may be less careful in
9
providing compliant treatment.'

VI. CONCLUSION
Since a causal relationship between non-economic damage
caps and medical malpractice insurance levels is at best unclear, the
legislative intent of the caps is hard to justify. The evidence is mixed
as to whether non-economic damage caps lead to decreased medical
malpractice insurance premiums. Some statistical evidence shows
that in the past where states have enacted non-economic damage caps
in medical malpractice cases, there was no significant impact,
positively or negatively, on malpractice insurance premiums once
other factors that may affect medical malpractice premiums were
taken into consideration.1 99 However, other studies conclude that
non-economic damage caps significantly impact medical malpractice
premiums negatively.
The proposed legislation to cap non-economic damages is
unlikely to affect medical malpractice insurance prices or the
majority of victims of medical malpractice since they do not file
claims. Instead the non-economic damage cap will affect the most
severely injured victims who do have cases with merit and make it
into court. On the other hand, a crossover effect may occur where
higher economic damages are awarded by the jury to compensate for
less non-economic damages, in which case overall damage
compensation may not be affected.2 °°
The question for Congress is whether it is worthwhile to take
a gamble on the future rates of medical malpractice premiums,
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knowing state tort reform history, at the expense of the severely
injured medical malpractice victims who will largely endure the
effects of caps on non-economic damages. The actual effects of the
bill will ultimately determine the constitutionality of the legislation,
especially from the perspective of equal protection. Given the
potentially large costs to severely injured malpractice victims and the
precarious benefit to physicians and health care consumers, Congress
should consider the elements of House Bill 534 carefully to ensure
that its costs and benefits are as predictable as they think.

